Political Inequality and the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine

by Olga Zelinska, Polish Academy of Sciences

It was the summer of 2013 and the people of Ukraine felt helpless. During this time of ‘soft authoritarianism,’ they saw rampant corruption while corporations and other business interests enjoyed a privileged place in the center of Ukrainian politics. The highly centralized state apparatus, controlled by one political and business ‘family’, made public influence over policy-making ineffective. Frustrated with meaningless mechanisms to participate in political decision-making and suffering from economic hardships, those unhappy with the status quo demanded social change with the contentious means.

While the right to political participation is guaranteed by the Constitution, Ukrainian democracy’s various mechanisms, such as public hearings or public councils, remained weak and did not bring the desired results.

The government’s order to reverse the foreign policy course on European integration was a last straw. Ukrainians marched onto public squares in Kyiv and in towns and villages throughout the nation. It was the Maidan protest movement, and what was called the Revolution of Dignity.

By Helgi - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=29821993
By Helgi – Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=29821993

I analyzed 94 resolutions issued by local Maidans in the 57 cities and towns of the country. I asked three main questions:

(1) How did the claimants identify themselves and their actions?
(2) How did they justify their actions?
(3) What did the claimants want?

My analysis suggests that the Revolution of Dignity was not only about European integration or the impeachment of Ukrainian President Yanukovych. I found that:

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Five Problems with Measuring Political Inequality

How much political inequality is there? Is political inequality rising, falling, or staying the same? To answer these questions, we would have to measure the idea of “political inequality.”

Here are five main problems in measuring political inequality:  

1. Political influence is hard for scientists to observe.  Political influence is notoriously difficult to measure because it is an interaction between power wielders that is more inferred than directly observed.  We tend to “see” power after the decision is made, not during the decision process.

2. The range of potential political resources is extremely diverse and heavily dependent on context.  Political resources are anything one can use to influence a political decision: social or psychological factors – material, ideational, a personal attribute, a group level attribute, an authority position, a network connection – or an action, such as political participation. In international perspective, this is further complicated by seeking a measure that is functionally equivalent across nations.  

3. Political outcomes is also hard to measure. To answer the question, “does political inequality matter?”, we would have to empirically demonstrate that governmental decisions systematically favor some groups over others. Some recent work in the U.S. is exemplary (see the Gilens and Page argument below). Similar work outside the American context is rare.

4. Political equality never existed. Is political equality a real, empirically visible end of the continuum? If political equality is an ideal then does a theoretical endpoint belong in an empirical measure?

5. We need to specify the particular type of political inequality. Political inequality can be found anywhere within the political process. Let’s simplify the political process to two parts – voice and response.   Voice refers to how constituencies express their interests to decision-makers directly or through representatives.  Response refers to how decision-makers act and react to their constituencies and is expressed via policy and symbols.

The Gilens and Page Measure of Political Inequality

A recent article on inequality and policy outcomes by Gilens and Page highlights the promise and the difficulties in measuring political inequality. Their unique data consists of 1779 policies taken up by the U.S. Congress from the 1980s to the early 2000s. Each policy is matched to a public opinion survey research question asked during the time the policy was introduced (“this policy says X, to what extent do you agree with it?”) and to a set of interest groups who have taken a position on the policy. With these data, they gauged the extent to which the policy outcome reflects (a) the will of the median voter – identified within the surveys and (b) types of interest groups, such as economic elites, business interests, and mass public interest groups. They found that policy outcomes tend to favor the will of economic elites, not the median voter. Their study provides solid, further evidence of the paucity of pluralism in American democracy.

Gilens and Page recently published a spirited and convincing defense of their findings, but we should consider how the basis of their study — the measure of political inequality — has some fundamental problems.

A. They chose policies based on whether they were asked in public opinion surveys, and that means the many, not-so-famous policy debates that also shape key economic distribution policies were excluded.

B. Nor can it account for the policies that are off the Congressional agenda, the type of power that Bachrach and Baratz (1962) warned that is most pernicious: the power to compel voters to not even ask for the policy in the first place.

C. It is also specific to the American experience; though it can be replicated elsewhere, so far there is no cross-national equivalent to these data.

Gilens and Page conducted what is likely one of the best and most unique studies on American political inequality, and it’s just a start.

Josh (2)


Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow is an Associate Professor at the Polish Academy of Sciences. This post is adapted from the article, “Political Inequality is International, Interdisciplinary, and Intersectional,” published by Sociology Compass in 2015.


Statement on the Study of Political Inequality

Social scientists have long argued that political power is a key dimension of stratification (Weber 1946; Lenski 1966; Dahl 2006), yet few empirically analyze political inequality (Winters and Page 2009).   Although attention to global inequality has increased in the social stratification literature, most examine income (Firebaugh 1999; Milanovic 2002; Neckerman and Torche 2007), some examine health (Goselin and Firebaugh 2004), and almost none examine political influence (Anderson and Beramendi 2008).  Most discussions of political inequality consist of philosophical debates over whether political equality is possible, or even necessary (Verba 2006; Bohman 1999; Dahl 2006; Ware 1981).  The few empirical discussions neither explicitly discuss the methodological implications of their measures of political inequality nor discuss how they can be applied cross-nationally (Winters and Page 2009; Anderson and Beramendi 2008).  This is a huge gap in our knowledge of how modern societies work.

This brief statement has three parts.  First, I present many definitions of political inequality, and argue each implies a distinct empirical measure.  Second, I suggest some empirical measures of political inequality.  Third, I offer a sketch of the field of political inequality.

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Notes on Winters and Page’s (2009) “Oligarchy in the U.S.?”

Winters, Jeffrey A. and Benjamin I. Page.  2009.  “Oligarchy in the United States?”  Perspectives on Politics 7(4): 731 – 751.

What the Article Is About
Winters and Page (Hereafter, WP) argue that all modern democracies, regardless of level of democracy, can be oligarchies.   Oligarchy and democracy can, and do, “coexist comfortably” (731).  WP ask whether the U.S. is an oligarchy.

WP want to “advance the research agenda” of the APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy, and goad political scientists to “treat power… more seriously” (732).

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More Notes on Piven and Cloward’s (2005) Discussion of Power Resources

Piven and Cloward (2005) discuss power resources.  “…it is perhaps the most important dispute in the discussion of power.  What are to be regarded as power resources?” (36)

Distributional approaches:
Weber: “all conceivable qualities of a person and all conceivable combinations of circumstances may put him in a position to impose his will in a given situation” (as cited in Wrong 1979:23).

Collins (1975):  “the resources for conflict are complex,” comprising just about everything

Dahl (1961): “anything that can be used to sway the specific choices or strategies of another individual”

Oberschall (1973): “anything from material resources… to nonmaterial resources”

Giddens (1985): allocative vs. authoritative resources

Etzioni (1968): utilitarian/material resources vs. normative/symbolic (see also Gamson 1968)

Tilly (1978): economists’ factors of production

Mills (1956): occupation of key positions/”command posts.”

One kind of resource can be used to gain another.

Piven and Cloward: “from this perspective, power resources are the attributes or things that one actor can use to coerce or induce another actor… almost everyone has something that can be used to influence somebody” (37).

Key resources are not widely distributed, but are concentrated at the top of the social hierarchy (37). 

Yet, those at the lower end do still influence social change.  How?

Interdependent relations, or interdependency approach: 

Piven and Cloward:  “the effective exercise of power in electoral representative institutions… does not result simply from a general currency of things or traits and the pattern of their distribution but rather depends on the specific relationships that make particular things or traits useful and important.”  (38).

“…in addition [to disembodied attributes, resources for power] are derived from the patterns of interdependence that characterize all social life” (39). 

“People have potential power, the ability to make others do what they want, when those others depend on them for the contributions they make to the interdependent relations that are social life” (39).

Power is embedded in interaction.  Power resources – or, rather, what are considered as power resources – are dependent on the interactional context.  “Control over capital is an effective resource for exercising power over others because those others are already entangled in a system of economic relations that makes them dependent on entrepreneurs for the means of production and subsistence” (39).

The exception is force – either the threat or actual physical force.  This is an important and possibly far-reaching exception, as force is embedded in many social interactions. 

The basic assumption is that actors are equal in the power relationship.

Giddens (1984): “much of day-to-day interaction is routine and is subject only to reflexive monitoring and rationalization” (34).  Piven and Cloward: “most of the time, people only try to make their everyday lives.  They do not try to make history” (41).

These interactional contexts in which power arises are in “the systems of interdependence that constitute societies” (40).  Systems are plural: “A web of complex networks of political, economic, and cultural interdependencies has to be analyzed if the actual potential for power by different participants in these networks is to be deciphered” (41).

The interdependency approach shares intellectual terrain with “exchange theorists.”  Power is “an attribute of relationships,” not of social actors.  They criticize Blau’s theory that power imbalances are the result of asymmetrical contributions to needed things:  employers have more power because they supply the jobs and those with less power have less to contribute to whatever is needed.  “Needed services” contributions… but landowners, do they contribute more than the workers who build the estate?  How is this measured?  P&C accuse Blau of justifying—even morally – power imbalance.

But if equality of contributions is inherent in mutual, interdependent relationships, why is the distribution of economic and status resources unequal?  Why don’t people use the potential power embedded in these interactions?

Value of contributions cannot be measured, and is therefore not the answer.  There are seven reasons why participants do not exercise their potential power:

1.  Consciousness: “people must recognize their potential power before they can act on it.”
2.  Coordination: in circumstances of collectivities, action requires coordination across similarly situated actors (as opposed to husband and wife relationships).
3.  Staying power: “power seekers must be able… to tolerate the costs” of acting.
4.  Control over supply of alternatives: “power seekers” must be able to prevent the other parties from going around them, circumnavigating them, to get what they want (via scabs, etc.).
5.  Exit: “contenders do not respond to challenges by simply exiting… or threatening to exit” (43) the relationship.
6.  Third-party leverage: “power seekers must be “free from constraints” from another, third party, that could intervene (e.g. courts intervening in labor disputes, e.g. Reagan firing the air-traffic controllers.
7.  Force:  power seekers must be free from threat or use of physical force.

“Social rules inhibit the activation of interdependencies and hence restrict the wide exercise of power” (43).

“Rules… [specify] the behaviors that are permissible by different parties in interdependent relations” (44).  Only certain rules are of interest: those that have direct bearing on power exercise.  The system of interdependencies, i.e. the context in which power interactions operate, include “rules” which legitimate “the actions available to some contenders while delimiting the actions available to others” (44).

Key to P&C’s theory is the legitimation of power exercise.  Legitimation is institutionalized, embedded in institutions that organize social life, such as law, policy.  Focus of power struggles is over rules—their legitimacy and their enforcement.  Once rules are legitimized, power interactions are characterized as being one-sided because the power seekers who attempt to break the rules no longer have legitimate means of challenging other parties. 

The role of the state is to formulate, impose and enforce the rules.

Agency in P&C’s approach:  They go back and forth on the constraints of social structure and the capacity of people to think and act beyond the constraints of social structure.  Because people are reflexive, they have the capacity to transcend constraints of social structure.  Reflexivity can therefore change the dynamic of power interactions, enabling rule breaking.


Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward.  2005.  “Rule Making, Rule Breaking, and Power” pp. 33 – 53 in The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization edited by Thomas Janoski, Robert Alford, Alexander Hicks, and Mildred A. Schwartz.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.