Power Inequality: Trends in Europe

Inequality is generally understood as long-standing structured differences in social, economic, legal, and political resources. Inequalities intersect, such that power inequality is associated with economic, legal, social, and political inequality.

What is power inequality?

Power inequality is defined as structured differences in the capacity of principals to realize their will against the interests and efforts of subalterns. (See What is Power? What is a Power Structure?).

Everyday citizens receive the brunt of power inequality. Representation and participation should empower those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. Yet, across nations and time, an individual’s position in the social structure interacts with the economic and political environment to repress the mass actions that could, potentially, push the elites toward fair economic redistribution.

How does power inequality endure? There are two mechanisms (see Lopez and Dubrow 2020). One mechanism is how elites reproduce inequalities, or “elite coordination.” A second mechanism is how social inequalities structure participation and contestation. We call this second mechanism, “mass discoordination.” The two key mechanisms of elite coordination and mass discoordination feed off of each other. The uneven distribution of power resources encourages the elite — who head the democratic institutions and set the rules — to pursue greater concentration; meanwhile, the elite-led institutions that allow such disparities to occur promote roadblocks that either prevent groups from participating, such as in the case of disenfranchised citizens, or discourages collective coordination around shared interests. The masses remain aggrieved yet disorganized.

I examine power inequality in its two main forms: political voice and economic control.

Political Voice

Political voice is (a) participation – verbal, physical, symbolic, monetary, or otherwise – in the political sphere by individuals, organizations, social groups, interest groups, or entire populations in electoral and non-electoral situations. Voice refers also to (b) representation by movements, organizations, legislative representatives, or political leaders and other public figures. Representation has many dimensions (e.g. Pitkin 1967; Mansbridge 2003). From a voice perspective, representation is someone or something engaged in the expression of interests in the political sphere on behalf of others or to promote an idea.

Economic Control

Economic control refers to the degree of freedom individuals and groups have to access and acquire the material resources necessary to thrive in capitalist society. Power inequality is directly related to economic control. In societies with high power equality, individuals and social groups have greater economic control. In societies with high power inequality, individuals and social groups have lesser economic control.

Relationship between Political Voice and Economic Control

Political voice and economic control intersect. Political participation is a core aspect of political voice and it is a foundation of European democracies. Of the social forces that act in tandem to influence political participation, economic inequality, social spending, and clientelism loom large. Whereas economic inequality in modern capitalist societies is associated with the maldistribution of political power and unequal political engagement, institutional contexts of the political economy can amplify or dampen the impact of economic inequality. In theory, social spending should mitigate the negative externalities of economic inequality through the provision of the social and economic resources to individuals and social groups that they need to participate in politics. Equitable social spending across socioeconomic strata should relieve social and economic burdens that make it difficult for disadvantaged groups to participate in democratic life, and thus buoy the participatory environment. Yet, social spending is not necessarily equally distributed; clientelism intervenes to push resources towards already politically and economically advantaged groups, thus lowering the level of political participation. (See POLINQ Project).

Political voice inequality is the inequality in influence – directly via political participation and indirectly through party representation – over the government decisions that impact society. Exacerbating voice inequality are economic conditions, including economic inequality. Whereas macro-level economic inequality matters under some conditions, what matters more is how structural inequalities, economic ones included, impact vulnerable disadvantaged social groups. Grievances of the masses are multi-dimensional – economic, as well as social and political – such that low income and low political opportunities leads to political dissatisfaction with external institutions.

Theoretical model of power inequality

In Figure 1, I summarize the theoretical framework. It is a multivalent structure in which power inequality attacks society at all levels. The macro-level’s economic, political, legal, and social factors are national and Europe-wide contexts that influence the meso-level organizations and institutions. The macro and meso layers influence the thoughts, behaviors, and experiences of social groups and individuals. The macro, meso, and micro-levels combine to both create society and form the deleterious inequalities that destabilize democratic institutions and lower democratic quality. Positive and negative events within the macro-meso-micro structures can alter the form, speed, duration, and magnitude of this recursive cycle.

Through this model, we can view how inequalities travel through the macro-meso-micro dimensions to impact society’s power inequalities. Power inequalities throughout the system destabilize social institutions and degrade the quality of democracy and social well-being.

Figure 1. Theoretical Model of Power Inequality

The model is inspired by Coleman’s Boat. We can view “power inequality” as the prow of the boat. The arrows indicate association, rather than causality. The arrow from “Micro” to “power inequality” means all of micro, and not just “behaviors.” The definition of “institutions” can vary. I separate them from macro-structures even though some may consider them as macro-structures. The entire model is recursive, meaning that all of the parts intersect and repeat across time based on these redounding and reinforcing relationships.

The point of the model is to explain how power inequality influences society. Indeed, power relations permeate the model. Power in economic, political, and social relationships determine peoples’ acquisition and access to scarce and valued resources, including power itself. Power guides practices, policies, and discourses.

Practices, policies, and discourses occur in the meso-layer. They are what we do, what is codified, and what we talk and write about. They are both the input into, outcomes of, unequal power relations. The list of meso-level organizations and institutions is long and can be longer.

The micro-layer has three parts: values (and attitudes), behaviors, and identities/experiences/demographics. The “behaviors” are what people do, or report that they do, and what we social scientists can observe. We can view their occupations (jobs), political participation, and discriminatory or equality-producing practices (whether they promote discrimination or equality).

The stakeholder environment is the clientelism, favoritism, and other -isms that impact who the power structure benefits. The stakeholders should be named: they are the masses, and that includes the workers in the meso-layer and the people not in the meso-layer; they are also the elite who are outliers in power and resources. The elite hail from various sectors of the meso-layer.

For example, economic structures impact how electoral institutions function (in essence giving preference to candidates from privileged backgrounds and occupations) that create policies to promote pro-inequality norms. This leads to discriminatory behaviors that impact the experiences of disadvantaged groups, e.g. from lower socioeconomic status. A result is that their voices are marginalized, e.g. lesser representation and lower impact of their political participation, and social well being degrades.

Power inequality prevails, and thus policies are not designed for the disadvantaged.

Trends in Power Inequality

Let’s examine trends in power inequality over time, especially the intersection of political voice and economic control. The V-Dem codebook v.12 defines the measure, “Political Equality” (pp. 207 – 209).

See our series on “Power Equality as measured by the Varieties of Democracy Project”

V-Dem guides the experts attention to particular groups’ political equality: (a) socioeconomic position, (b) social groups, (c) gender, and (d) sexual orientation. V-Dem tells the expert that all countries have economic inequality, whether wealth or income, to at least some degree. V-Dem is concerned here with the link, as Manza (2015) does, between economic inequality and the distribution of political power, or what they call the “political effects” of unequal economic distribution.

V-Dem posits three hypothetical groups – the wealthy, the average person, and the poor. There are four possible responses: (0) Wealthy have a monopoly on power; (1) Wealthy are dominant, the average have little power, the poor none at all; (2) the wealthy have a “strong hold on power,” and the average and the poor have a little bit of power but only over the things that the wealthy do not bother to contest; (3) The wealthy and the average have about equal influence, and the poor has significant influence; (4) complete political equality between the three groups.

In the East, the immediate post-1989 era brought a rise in power inequality between socioeconomic groups (Figure 2). (see Socioeconomic Status: Definition and Measurement). Whereas, around 1989, power was relatively equally distributed across SES groups, by the 2010s, the wealthy had a strong hold on power. In the West, equality was never on the table. However, they managed to maintain less power inequality than the East.

Figure 2. Power Distributed by Socioeconomic Position in Europe, East and West, 1989 – 2020s

Does this situation hold if we change the measure? As a quasi-robustness check, I examine the question, “social class equality in respect for civil liberty” from V-Dem. This V-Dem item was managed by Svend-Erik Skaaning. Here, V-Dem experts were asked, “Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do?” They clarify the question:

“This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socioeconomic groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.”

Thus, it is substantively similar to the “political equality of socioeconomic groups,” as they reduce class to SES. This is a mistake in terms of defining social class, but since I am interested in economic control as defined and measured by SES, it is a valid measure.

The experts could choose between the following responses: “0: Poor people enjoy much fewer civil liberties than rich people; 1: Poor people enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than rich people; 2: Poor people enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than rich people; 3: Poor people enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than rich people; 4: Poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people.

Figure 3. Social class equality with respect to civil liberties, East and West, 1989 – 2020s

Figure 3 describes a situation similar to that of power distributed by socioeconomic position. After 1989, the East declined such that, more or less, the economically disadvantaged have lesser civil liberties than that of the economically advantaged. The West fare somewhat better across this time, but the enjoyment of civil liberties is still far from equal.

            In sum, from 1989 to the present, citizens in the East and in the West are unequal when it comes to the distribution of power and the enjoyment of civil liberties. Where as the East had declined, they declined toward the level of the West, and surpassed them in power inequality. The West is no paradise when it comes to power equality; they have been consistently unequal even without a political and economic revolution. We should note that the Great Recession of 2008 did not have much of an impact on power inequality.


Zolberg’s Moments of Madness

I summarize and critique a classic article in the fields of protest and social movements by Aristide R. Zolberg, “Moments of madness.” Politics & Society 2, no. 2 (1972): 183-207.

See also…

Zolberg’s Thesis

Zolberg’s thesis, designed to help us understand social and political change, is simple. During an intense social and political situation, such as a revolution, there is a mass feeling that everything could change. The main quote is in the first sentence: “what are we to make of moments when human beings living in modern societies believe that ‘all is possible’?” (183). Zolberg calls them, “moments of madness.” 

Theory: Moments of Madness

Zolberg’s theory is based on a combination of collective behavior and social psychology. Zolberg argued that such mass events are a temporary yet major disruption to normal patterns of social and political behavior. The result is a collective sense of “madness” that temporarily overtakes individuals and groups, wherein they believe that the old order of things is no longer viable — they think that something was wrong with it — and a new order could be built. Madness occurs only during some periods and in special circumstances. 

These moments are opportunities for individuals and groups to experiment with new ideas and forms of collective action, power structures, and ideologies. It allows people to see themselves anew, and thus it allows them to see society anew. 

“In short, that project, repeatedly achieved at least in part, consists in the immediate transformation of society through a drastic change of the conceptions human beings have of that society and of themselves” (203). 

In this cognitive liberation (e.g. McAdam) “it is through drastic changes in the experiences of individuals, already socialized into the existing society, that the transformational processes noted above occur” (207).

Moments can create change because they are part of the process of major political change which, historically, have always featured some kind of protest. Thus, moments are tied to political participation, though the causality is not clear. Perhaps they have a reciprocal relationship — protest → madness → more protest → more madness … change, though protest perhaps occurs first.

The outcomes of moments are not necessarily a new and better society. Indeed, utopianism can give way to pessimism or dystopianism. “What we remember most is that moments of political enthusiasm are followed by bourgeois repression or by charismatic authoritarianism, sometimes by horror but always by the restoration of boredom” (205). However, there can be good things that come out of it. There are “lasting political accomplishments that are perhaps made possible only by the suspension of disbelief in the impossible which is characteristic of moments of madness” (206). 

Evidence for Moments of Madness

Empirically, Zolberg’s evidence is based on the writings, generally of intellectuals, from several major events in French history from the 19th and 20th centuries, including a revolution in 1848 and the civil unrest in May 1968. Zolberg quotes pamphlets that declare “All is Possible!” and a diarist who wrote about “an eruption of volcanic happiness,” of “absolute magic” (185). Zolberg writes about the “atmosphere of the streets” (185) where people feel free and think that a utopia (Marxist or socialist) is possible. Zolberg strings together the writings of these varied events because, together, they give “the phenomenon a persuasive concreteness each event may not possess individually” (196). In this method, the idea is to collect everything into one jar to better see their connections.

Criticisms of the Moments of Madness thesis

It is difficult to know whether such “moments of madness” really exist. From these writings it is difficult to generalize: they may exist for the writers that Zolberg quotes, but it is not clear whether these writers accurately portray the situation for others, especially those outside of the intelligentsia. Since the evidence is not wholly convincing, the merit of Zolberg’s thesis is whether we perceive that this might occur, or if we have lived through it ourselves, and know it to be true. 

The thesis ignores the role of elites in generating policy, and that turnover of elites does not mean that the ideas of the old elite will disappear. By cultural transmission or by pragmatism, policies are transferred to the new elite. Often, new administrations keep the policies of the old administration, because a brand new society is difficult to conceive and implement from nothing. Indeed, the moments of madness may yield nothing more than incremental change. Incremental changes happen all the time — do we need a revolution and the attendant moment of madness for these changes to occur? 


This article, published in 1972, was likely inspired by the events of 1968, when protests by students and workers, who were dissatisfied with the country’s social and political situation, were met with force by the government. 

Zolberg asks whether the moments of madness are rooted in features specific to French society. This would require a comparative perspective.

This post was written by Joshua K. Dubrow and funded, in part, by the National Science Centre, Poland (2021/43/B/HS6/01155) entitled “The Construction of Post-Pandemic Society: Covid-19 Street Protest in Poland.”

Social Movement Theory: Fields, Arenas, and Players

Social movement theory typically uses the concepts of fields, arenas, and players or actors. But these concepts seem to be conceptually similar. In this post, I critique two articles by prominent social movement theorists to understand fields, arenas, and players. At the end, I attempt a synthesis.

See also: Social Movement Outcomes

Social Movement Fields

Useem, Bert, and Jack A. Goldstone. “The paradox of victory: social movement fields, adverse outcomes, and social movement success.” Theory and Society 51, no. 1 (2022): 31-60.

The authors develop the concept of “fields” to understand the dynamics that govern the relation between movements and outcomes, including the duration of those outcomes. They claim that we must move from the simple dyad of “movement→target” to an accounting of the complex environment in which movements may or may not cause outcomes. The consequences of using only a dyadic relationship (e.g. challenger – incumbent or movement-target) in which the challenger/target has changed its behavior (from T1 to T2) has dire consequences: “if we do not escape from treating movement outcomes in the ‘challenger-incumbent’ view, we will stumble in seeking to explain paradoxical results and will misidentify actual outcomes” (35). Misidentification and misattribution are core problems in establishing causal relationships.

Outcomes are a change in “the alignment of the broader social movement feld” (32). “Success” is a “favorable” alignment in this field. Polarization is a particularly pernicious force that can lead to negative outcomes, including reversals of movement successes.

What is a field?

The concept of field is developed from Bourdieu and from DiMaggio and Powell. There is no single model (34). 

Fields consist of interactions between actors and institutions in the field. “social movement dynamics should always be seen as an interaction between movements, their targets, and other actors and institutions comprising a social movement feld” (36) This seems tautological — social movement dynamics are the dynamics of a social movement field. It makes no sense.

Who is in the field?

There are many actors in the field, including “potential allies, countermovements, the public, and multiple actors in positions of authority” (33). Later, the authors write more expansively about the “broader” movement field, “which includes not only the movement and its target, but also active and potential counter-movements, active and potential coalition partners, the broader public, and other organizations and actors who, though not the target of the movement, would be affected by the movement’s actions and goal” (34).

How to use fields?

They must be identified and “analyzed as a whole” (35 – 36). On p. 37, they attempt to show how to apply the concept of fields through the concepts of victory and success. They try to make a distinction between “victory” and “success,” an argument that only an academic could love. In reality, they are the same. I suppose what they wanted to argue is that “victory” is short-term, narrow, and potentially temporary and “success” is long-term, broad, and potentially durable. They could have just said so, but instead, they tried to make a clever distinction between synonyms. They elaborate further on p. 56.

Their empirical cases for this Theory & Society article are a comparison between Yale University and the University of Missouri. Each protested against racial injustice. Yale had a lasting success in changing aspects of the racially discriminatory system and UM had a polarizing and short-term “victory” on these scores. The empirical analysis they provide seems trivial: both percent of Black students enrolled and revenues may and likely have nothing to do with protests, and show only slight fluctuations anyway. The “field” may or may not matter because, as the authors themselves eloquently explain the divergent situation in the conclusion: 

“Yale is a rich private school in a generally progressive northeastern state, with exceptional resources to respond to requests for additional spending. The University of Missouri is a public university in a state with a long history of racial segregation (Mizzou admitted its first Black undergraduate only in 1950, eighty years after Yale had done so). The University of Missouri is also far more dependent on tuition revenues than Yale…” (50).

This shows the limits of “field” and its porous conceptual boundary with “context.” The “field” is embedded in an historical context. Obviously, one cannot attribute actions of each movement without considering the divergent historical contexts in which they operate. Yale and UM had similar actions, but the effect was likely not due to their actions in that field, but to the historical context. If UM should have acted differently, then the authors should have posited a counterfactual.


Jasper, James M. “Linking arenas: structuring concepts in the study of politics and protest.” Social Movement Studies 20, no. 2 (2021): 243-257.

The purpose of the article is to propose a superior vocabulary for understanding actions within social movements. The key concepts are arenas and players.  Jasper sets arenas and players as a superior vocabulary intended to clarify a myriad of other concepts, including “institutions, fields, spaces, systems, and related concepts (sectors, worlds, configurations, and more)” (253). Jasper believes that many social movement frameworks and concepts can be reduced to arenas and players.

Jasper’s main critical target is structures. He argues that actors and structures are integral and integrated, but structures constrain only to a point. Structural theories do not acknowledge their limits, he argues. Criticizing the extant literature of structures, he argues, “The lesson is that any theory of constraint and structure needs to be paired with a theory of players, intentions, psychology, culture, and action” (244). These are vague terms that need definition. For example, he never defines “intentions” or “action.” Jasper criticizes structures at length later in the article (pp. 246 – 249).

Despite my criticisms, I value this article because there are strong attempts at definitions of the main concepts. At least Jasper gives us something we can work with.

Definition of Arena

Jasper’s definition: “Arenas are physical places where players interact to generate decisions and other outcomes; they contain objects ranging from doors and seats to quotes chiseled into marble walls to illumination and amplification devices, but they also have formal rules and informal expectations, as well as something at stake in the decisions made.” (244) Parenthetically, he adds, “some authors usefully employ the term more metaphorically, or as an aggregate, such as public opinion or the media as arenas” (244).

Let’s break that down: Arenas can be physical and material or intangible and ideational. Rules and expectations, which can be formal or informal, influence thoughts and behavior of the actors within. I don’t know what “something at stake” means.

Whereas “Arenas are intended as micro-level building blocks, the places where weighty strategic engagements occur” (253), arenas may or may not be places of decisions — they may have other, I suppose non-decisional, activities within them (250).

Definition of Players

Jasper defined players as “individuals or groups who have some shared identity, some common goals, and who operate in at least one arena” (244). 

Let’s break that down: Players have a shared identity. Players can be in multiple arenas simultaneously, and have different roles and advantages and disadvantages within them. “Almost always, a player has access to some arenas but not others; more advantages in some arenas than in others; and some choice of which arenas to enter, which arenas to put resources and attention in.” (247). Players are not necessarily objectively verifiable networks. They may be “imagined communities or necessary fictions” (246). Despite the shared identity and aims, they are not necessarily unified: “Players are constantly shifting, dissolving, and recombining” (245). 

How do players interact?

They interact in “long sequences” of action and reaction. They do so within the historical circumstance: “players and arenas reflect the weight of history” (245). Their alliances shift and can be fragile (250). They compete and cooperate. 

Structures & Stability and Arenas & Players

Jasper downplays structures as objective realities and finds their importance in how people perceive structures. Jasper writes, “both arenas and players contain some structural influences” (245). Structures matter: “Cultural-strategic models like this one still recognize external constraints…“ (245). But Jasper emphasizes the subjective aspects of constraints: “…at least as filtered through our expectations and calculations” (245). These perspectives matter for how they view the possibilities of action: “a structural barrier is insurmountable if a player believes it is” (246). They may also be tougher than players realize, he also argues. He criticizes structures as downplaying nuance and favoring stronger, more powerful actors and institutions over everyone else.

There are static structures, but structures change. Players shift. Arenas morph: “Arenas also change constantly” (245).

Blurred Distinction between arenas and players

Most troublesome for Jasper’s argument is that arenas and players may be the same. “It can be difficult to distinguish a player and an arena,” he writes (246). “Players can become arenas (all of them do when they make decisions),” he writes (246). Indeed, “players and arenas are meant to be observable, tangible entities,” but they may not be (246). How a player can also be an arena, Jasper does not make clear.

If arenas and players are the same, then what are the conceptual boundaries that separate them? How can we meaningfully and empirically observe their differences? In short, what is the use of the concepts if we cannot profitably deploy them to understand reality?

Jasper’s Criticisms of Fields

Jasper criticizes fields. “A field, to be worthy of the name and of all this fuss, must exert a force of its own directly on the players in it, a force that does not come from other players” (249). Fields exert force because they are connected to structures, but this leads to a “potential circularity of fields: players have the gains and losses they do because of their positions on the field, but those gains and losses also place them on that field” (248). 

Fields, then, merge players and arenas, but this is not a good solution, according to Jasper. Even though Jasper writes that arenas and players may be difficult to distinguish (246), he argues that “The forthright solution is to separate players and arenas” (249). A field is a set of arenas: “A field might range from a single arena, in which case it is not very interesting, up to a whole set of arenas linked in various ways” (249). This is a precursor to his conceptual use of “aggregation.”

Jasper’s criticism of Spaces

Jasper also criticizes spaces. Jasper writes that “The term spaces promises, on the basis of its root metaphor, to identify locations of protest (251). But spaces are not necessarily physical: “Beyond the actual physical locations of protest activities, space primarily remains a metaphorical means to talk about the movement sector” (251). Jasper criticizes space, then, as having boundary issues, and then reduces it to the vocabulary of arenas and players: space is useful “as a way to talk about aggregations of linked players, especially around a set of issues” (251).


Jasper is concerned with aggregations, both appropriate and inappropriate. Are fields aggregations of players and arenas? (250). Are aggregations of fields the “protest space” or “social movement sector”? 

Jasper does not define aggregation, but we know it as “A whole formed by combining several separate elements.” (Oxford english dictionary online). The aim of constructing an aggregate is to enable social scientists to observe the phenomenon of interest. We aggregate to directly see some phenomenon that we believe to exist. If the aggregate was not there, we would never have directly seen that phenomenon.

Aggregations introduce boundary problems — where one thing has its place, aggregation groups it with others, and the boundaries between the individual (thing, node) and the newly formed aggregate blend. 

Fields and spaces may be aggregations. Fields may be aggregations of arenas: “we can preserve field as a reasonable word to get at aggregations of arenas” (252). Spaces may be aggregations, too, but of both arenas and players. “We are free to use fields to describe concatenations of specific arenas, and spaces to describe concatenations of players” (253).

Photo by Joe Yates on Unsplash

Combining Useem and Goldstone with Jasper: Fields and Arenas

Let’s call fields, arenas, and players as a conceptual framework (see: “Conceptual framework vs. Theoretical framework – and constructing each”). For a concept or conceptual framework to be useful, we must be able to define and observe it. We must be able to separate it from other concepts and conceptual frameworks. There must be useful, even if imperfect, boundaries.

Both the conceptual frameworks of fields and “arenas and players” have serious problems. Fields have a vague definition. Insomuch as they are a set of micro-meso-macro interactions, they still have porous boundaries; it is difficult to separate one field from another. Moreover, the conceptual distinction between fields and social structures is not sharp.

Arenas and players seem to have better conceptual definitions, but Jasper makes a series of arguments that muddy the clarity, and not in a good way. Players may be arenas, for example. Arenas and players constantly shift and morph. The boundaries between them are porous and hard to empirically distinguish.

OK. They have problems. Let’s see if we can synthesize them.

Let’s say that fields are a set of interactions that involve actors and institutions that operate within historical context and social structure. Fields’ actors have agency in which they attempt to change the structure, thereby altering the field. It is through action that fields change.

Because “set of interactions” is vague, let’s define a field further as an aggregation of arenas. Arenas are physical and material or intangible and ideational. Rules and expectations, which can be formal or informal, influence thoughts and behavior of the actors within. These rules and expectations are part of the social structure. 

For a social movement, the term “players” seems apt, as it imposes the idea of a shared identity and common goal. “Actor” is a vague term that does not have this imposition. 

For this to work, we need to resolve some problems. How can we deal with the extremely problematic blurring of arenas and players? We can ignore Jasper and say that players can not be arenas. We can also imagine other boundaries. How can we deal with aggregations? Are arenas and players the building blocks of fields and spaces? We can treat them as such, and say that arenas aggregate into fields, and “players” are the specific set of actors within those arenas.

This post was written by Joshua K. Dubrow and funded, in part, by the National Science Centre, Poland (2021/43/B/HS6/01155) entitled “The Construction of Post-Pandemic Society: Covid-19 Street Protest in Poland.”